Monotonicity in Social Welfare Functions
The ability to select a social welfare function wherein given a profile of individual preferences the society prefers alternative $A$ to alternative $B$ and a similar profile of individual preferences in which the only change is raise in $A$'s rank in some individual ranking(s), $A$ is still preferred over $B$.
I chair an office team and am comparing four rules that turn the members' ballots into a group ranking for choosing a venue for its end-of-year lunch. Each member ranks all three venues (alternatives). In a trial vote the ballots were: ballots Then change. Nothing else changed. Each of the four rules ranked the venues from the first ballots and from the changed ballots, as listed in the options (best first). Which rule violates monotonicity in this example?
Use it
from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("narunraman/steer", "sc_monotonicity_rules")curl "https://steer-benchmark.cs.ubc.ca/api/sample?element_name=sc_monotonicity_rules&n=5&seed=42"
See the Reference for the parameters.