STSTEER

Optimal Auction for Bidders with Differing Risk Attitudes

The ability to select the correct revenue maximizing auction when bidders are not risk-neutral. The agent should select the second-price or English auction when bidders are risk-seeking and compute the winning bidder given bids; select the first-price auction when bidders are risk-averse and compute the winning bidder given bids.

Question template

n cap risk-neutral fishing firms are bidding for a fishing quota sold by the fisheries agency. Their values are private and independently drawn from a uniform distribution between $0 and V. The fisheries agency runs a first-price sealed-bid auction with no reserve price. In the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium, how much does a bidder whose value is v bid?

Use it

from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("narunraman/steer", "auctions_risk")