Optimal Auction for Bidders with Affiliated Values
The ability to select the correct revenue maximizing auction when each bidder's value has an additional common-value component (e.g., the bidder's private, noisy signal about the good’s resale value). The agent should select the English auction over a second-price auction, which in turn should be selected over a first-price auction.
A charity is auctioning a private dinner with a famous chef to n word donors. Each donor's value comes only from their own enjoyment of the evening: the dinner cannot be resold, and one donor's value says nothing about another's. They care only about their expected profit. Each bidder already knows their own value. The bidders are alike: each one's information about the item is drawn in the same way, all of them bid as in the symmetric equilibrium of each format, and there is no reserve price. The seller will use this format: format. The seller also holds an independent expert's appraisal of the dinner. The appraisal says nothing about how much any bidder values it. Should the seller commit to publishing the appraisal to all bidders before the auction?
Use it
from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("narunraman/steer", "auctions_affiliated")curl "https://steer-benchmark.cs.ubc.ca/api/sample?element_name=auctions_affiliated&n=5&seed=42"
See the Reference for the parameters.